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DERRIDA, LAW, VIOLENCE AND THE
PARADOX OF JUSTICE
Michel Rosenfeld*
My contribution to this roundtable is meant to be in the form of
a comment on—or more precisely of a small supplement to—^Jacques
Derrida's extraordinarily rich and insightful text entitled Force of
Law: The "Mystical Foundation of Authority" ^ from the standpoint of
a common-law jurist. Derrida's text touches upon a vast number of
essential issues in jurisprudence, but I wish to focus on one issue in
particular: the relation between law, violence, and the paradox posed
by the concurrent requirement that justice be both universal and
singular.
Derrida succinctly captures the paradox of justice when he
writes:
To address oneself to the other in the language of the other is, it
seems, the condition of all possible justice, but apparently, in all
rigor, it is not only impossible ... but even excluded by justice as
law (droit), inasmuch as justice as right seems to imply an element
of universality, the appeal to a third party who suspends the unilaterality or singularity of the idioms.^

In other words, Derrida stresses that there is an unsurmountable gap
between justice as law, which must remain forever universal, and jus
tice as giving to each what is his or her due, which necessarily in
volves an element of irreducible singularity. Derrida's dichotomy
between justice as law and justice as each person's due is reminiscent,
moreover, of Aristotle's distinction between justice as equality and
justice as equity.^ However, whereas for Aristotle justice as equity is
meant to supplement justice as equality, for Derrida justice as each
person's due is not only impossible but it also completely frustrates
the achievement of justice as law. In the Aristotelian universe, justice
as equality is the rule and justice as equity is introduced to deal with
the exception. For Derrida, in contrast, every case appears to be an
exception, or more accurately—in view of the respective demands of
equality and of the irreducible singularity of the other—every case
should (but is inevitably bound to fail to) satisfy both the rule and the
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exception.'*
The disjunction between justice as equality and justice as equity
is linked in the Derridian vision—to a series of insurmountable op
positions that include: the clash between self and other, the singular
and the universal, the concrete and the abstract, and the rule and its
exceptions. Moreover, it is because it is caught between these insur
mountable oppositions that justice cannot avoid producing violence.
Thus, for example, when the self presses its claims in the name of
justice it is bound to do violence to the other. But, by the same token,
when the self restrains the pursuit of its own claims to do justice to
the other, it does violence to itself.
It would be not only dangerous but also plainly erroneous to in
fer that it necessarily follows from Derrida's behef in the impossibility
of achieving justice and in the inevitability of the link between vio
lence and the pursuit of justice that the quest for justice is meaningless
or that all plausible dispositions of the conflicting claims of self and
other are likely to be morally equivalent. Indeed, at least in my read
ing of Derrida, the quest for justice is a permanent ethical imperative.
Moreover, the particular form which that ethical imperative takes for
any given individual actor depends on the actual social and historical
circumstances surrounding that actor. Thus, although justice is ulti
mately beyond reach, the call to justice imposes real constraints that
circumscribe the legitimate choices open to morally responsible
actors.
Looking at the matter from the standpoint of an American jurist,
it is striking how close Derrida's conception of the relationship be
tween law and justice comes to that which emerges from the commonlaw system of adjudication. Under the common law, legal rules are
fashioned through the application of precedents. Confronted with the
clashing arguments of opposing litigants, the common-law judge seeks
a just resolution of the case at hand by reaching a verdict that is con
sistent with relevant past judicial decisions. The rule of law to be
applied to a pending case must be inferred from existing judicial
precedents. That rule, however, can never be completely elaborated
as Its full and final determination must await the completion of all
relevant future adjudications. Accordingly, whereas every adjudica
tion sharply circumscribes the legitimate avenues towards justice, so
" Stnctly speaking, the exception is defined in terms of the rule from which it deviates
and IS thus m some sense subordinate to the latter. In the context of a Derridian vision'
however, the subordination of the exception to the rule would unduly privilege the latter over
the former. Accordingly, I use "rule" here primarily to denote the universal side of justice and
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long as any future adjudication remains possible the achievement of
justice is necessarily postponed.
To illustrate how the common law makes justice both necessary
to pursue and impossible to achieve let us consider the following
rather banal example.' Suppose A's cat has entered on B's land and
wrecked the latter's flowers. B then sues his neighbor A and seeks
compensation for the wrecked flowers. To adjudicate this contro
versy, the judge must look to precedents. Let us assume, moreover,
that the judge finds a single precedent, namely a case where a cow's
owner was held liable for the damages caused when his cow entered
upon his neighbor's land. In these circumstances, the judge's decision
in the case between A and B depends on her assessment of whether
the situation involving the cat is sufficiently analogous to that con
cerning the cow. Because of the extremely schematic nature of the
example under consideration, we lack the means to make any princi
pled decision as to whether the situations involving respectively the
cow and the cat ought to be considered essentially alike or fundamen
tally different. Suppose, however, that the judge can justify the con
clusion that the two situations are alike in all relevant respects and
that B is therefore entitled to compensation from A. By linking the
precedent involving the cow with that regarding the cat one can begin
to infer a general legal rule, but without the benefit of further cases it
is impossible to specify which rule. One possible rule would be that
justice requires that an owner of domestic animals be liable for the
mischief which they cause; another, that an owner of any animal,
whether domestic or not, be so liable. Furthermore, a future case may
well decide between these two rules, but would leave open, for exam
ple, the question of whether an owner's children should be considered
akin to that Owner's domestic animals from the standpoint of the legal
responsibility under consideration. In short, the force of precedents
delimits paths towards justice but the dependence of legal rules on
future cases forces a perpetual postponement of justice—that is, of
justice understood as necessarily encompassing both the singularity of
each individual case and the universality of every fully elaborated
legal rule.
It is not necessary to remain within the confines of the common
law to appreciate that justice is inevitably caught between the univer
sal and the singular, the abstract and the concrete. Indeed, one can
not dispense genuine justice to a concrete other without first fulfilling
5 This example is based on the one provided in Rosenfeld, Deconstruction and Legal Inter
pretation: Conflict, Indeterminacy and the Temptations of the New Legal Formalism, 11 CARDOZO L. REV. 1211, 1231 n.48 (1990).
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the demands of abstract equality. Paradoxically, it is the need for
justice to fully account for the singularity of the concrete other which
makes recourse to abstract equality imperative. Moreover, this nexus
between abstract equality and concrete singularity is underscored by
the very structure of the search for justice in its two principal forms:
corrective or compensatory justice and distributive justice.
Compensatory justice seeks to wipe out the suflFering of a con
crete other by exacting compensation from the wrongdoer who has
caused the suffering. Compensatory justice aims at placing the victim
of wrongdoing in the position he or she would have been but for the
wrong sought to be compensated. This position is projected as the
singular historical position of a concrete person but is, in fact, a
counterfactual construct mediated by some criterion of abstract
equality. Not all sufferings or harms experienced by a concrete other
are subject to compensation, but only those that are recognized as
wrongs. And to be able to draw any cogent line between wrongs and
noncompensable harms, one must have recourse to some notion of
abstract equality.®
Distributive justice, which requires that the benefits and burdens
of social cooperation be allocated according to a plausible criterion of
proportional equality, is obviously dependent on the implementation
of some conception of abstract equality. For example, distributive
justice may require that allocation be made to each according to his or
her merit or according to his or her needs. Furthermore, notwith
standing its focus on abstract equality, distributive justice cannot be
satisfied without taking full account of the singularity of each con
crete person who belongs to the class of those entitled to claim distrib
utive rights. Thus, if the operative criterion were to each according to
his or her needs, distributive justice could not be fully realized before
every need of every person were properly taken into account in its
ultimately irreducible singularity.
Viewed phenomenologically, justice—whether compensatory or
distributive—requires the passage from concrete singularity to ab
stract equality and then back to the singularity of the concrete other.
At first, it is precisely by emphasizing the differences that mark the
distinction between self and other, that the self can cast the other as
^ For example, depending on whether one adopts formal equality or equality of welfare as
the operative criterion of abstract equality, one is likely to reach different conclusions concern
ing whether a person's action which causes another person significant economic harm amounts
to a compensable wrong. Thus, a proponent of formal equality rights would not consider the
harms due to the vicissitudes of economic competition to be compensable wrongs. A propo
nent of equality of welfare, on the other hand, may well maintain that at least some of these
harms should be treated as compensable wrongs.
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an inferior and treat him or her as an unequal.' To overcome the
injustices flowing from the use of difference to foster inequality, it is in
tum necessary to promote mutual recognition as equals, but that re
quires looking beyond concrete differences and relating to one another
as abstract egos that are essentially equal in dignity.® From the stand
point of abstract equality, equality tends to be correlated to identity.
Accordingly, persons can avoid being treated as inferiors, but only by
conforming to the identity projected by the dominant other.' In order
to overcome the limitations of abstract equality, it is necessary to re
turn to the singularity of each concrete person without regressing to
the position from which the concrete other tends to be perceived ex
clusively in terms of differences. In other words, the achievement of
justice ultimately depends on (the impossible to complete) synthesis
between the essential identity in dignity sustained by abstract equality
and the full diversity generated by the irreducible singularity radiated
by each concrete person.
Treating the other as inferior obviously entails violence. More
over, while perhaps less obvious, the pursuit of abstract equality and
the drive to vindicate the singularity of each concrete person also nec
essarily involve violence. Indeed, abstract equality looms as the prod
uct of the counterviolence that unhinges interpersonal relationships
predicated on inequality and of the violence that suppresses the differ
ences prone to hinder mutual recognition as subjects possessing equal
dignity. Furthermore, the drive to vindicate the singularity of each
concrete person without reverting to relationships of inequality is also
dependent on violence, although the violence in question is primarily
turned inward to curb the self's tendency to treat the other as an
inferior or to identify him or her as a mere abstract equal.
Justice is inevitably tied to violence, but that does not constitute
a justification to abandon its pursuit. Indeed, not all violence is alike,
as the violence involved in reducing another to a subservient position
clearly seems more objectionable than the (counter) violence required
to establish abstract equality or the self-directed violence associated
with promoting the singularity of the concrete other. Accordingly,
' For example, by emphasizing differences in skin color, the racist can cast members of
other races as inferiors and thus purport to justify denying them equal rights.
8 Cf. G. HEGEL, PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT
178-96 (A. Miller trans. 1977) (Hegel's
dialectic of master and slave).
® Thus, for instance, women may achieve equality at the workplace by behaving "like
men," that is by repressing their femininity and by concealing their needs as women. For a
more extended discussion of the tendency to correlate difference to inferiority and equality to
identity, see M. ROSENFELD, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND JUSTICE; A PHILOSOPHICAL AND
CONSTITUTIONAL INQUIRY 222-24 (1991).
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the nexus between justice and violence should not be a cause for des
pair, but rather a cause for sobering reflection. Similarly, the impossi
bility of achieving justice and the inability of law to fully account for
the universal and the singular should not be a cause for paralysis. On
the contrary, the inevitability of violence and the impossibility of jus
tice should be construed as a call to measured but continuous action
through law in efforts to reduce inequities and to promote equality
without sacrificing singularity. In the last analysis, that the task of
seeking justice can never be completed and that violence cannot be
eradicated from the path to law and justice should be viewed as im
portant truths that no ethical jurist can afford to ignore.

